I. Introduction
In "Omniprescient Agency" (Religious Studies 28, 1992) David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument-my own in "Agency and Omniscience" (Religious Studies 27, 1991)-assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused, in part, by the agent's intending. The latter, I claimed, is governed by a psychological principle of "least effort," viz., that no one intends without antecedently feeling that (i) deliberate effort is needed to achieve desired goals, (ii) such effort has a chance of success, and (iii) it is yet contingent whether the effort will be expended and the goals realized. The goals can be anything from immediate intentional doings, tryings or basic actions, to remote and perhaps unlikely consequences of actions, e.g., global justice. The thrust of the principle is that it would be impossible for a wholly rational self-aware agent to intend without a background presumption of an open future as concerns the desired state and the means to it. But this presumption embodies a sense of contingency which, in turn, requires an acknowledged ignorance about what the future holds, otherwise the future would appear closed relative to present knowledge with the desired state presented as either guaranteed (necessary) or ruled out (impossible). Regardless whether this self-directed attitude is accurate, it follows that intentional action precludes complete knowledge of one's present and future. Consequently, no omniscient or omniprescient being can be an agent.
Hunt's criticisms are directed against the following recasting of the argument (pp. 352-3-all page references to Hunt's article):
(1) There is nothing of which God is ignorant. (Divine Omniscience) (2) God is an agent-that is, there is a Z such that Z is an exercise of agency on the part of God. ((Divine Agency) (3) A is an exercise of agency on the part of X only if there is an action A and times t and t' (t ≤ t') such that X acquires at t an intention to A at t'. (Analysis of Agency) (4) X acquires at t an intention to A at t' only if X's A-ing at t' is an open alternative for X at t. (Presumption of Openness) (5) X's A-ing at t is an open alternative for X at t only if X is ignorant at whether or not he will A at t'. (Presumption of Ignorance) Therefore, (6) There is something of which God is ignorant. (7) (1) and (6) are contradictory. Therefore, (8) At least one of the premises (1)- (5) is false.
Attributing to me the view that not both (1) and (2) He, more anxious to defend traditional theism, rejects (P 3 ) and targets the premises on which it is based, specifically, (3) and (5) .
Before moving to an examination of his criticisms, two things must be clarified. First, the argument Hunt chooses to criticize is not quite the one I presented; not only do (4) and (5) fail to figure into my argument, but (P 3 ) is not a principle I accept. Nevertheless, the proximity of his to the version I actually gave renders his comments relevant, though rather than issuing in a decisive refutation of my argument against omniscient agency, they pave the way for an improved statement. Second, it suffices if the subsequent principles be restricted to ideally rational agents only, that is agents whose sets of beliefs are consistent and closed under a suitably broad consequence relation. 1 Since an omniscient being's beliefs would be coextensive with what it knows, it follows immediately that it would be an ideally doxastically rational agent.
II. The Acquisition of Intentions
Hunt singles out the following claim as central to the argument for premise (5): (2.4) X intends (something) only if there is an action A and times t and t' (t ≤ t') such that X acquires at t an intention to A at t'. He then argues that this is based upon the further contentions, (C 1 ) Acquisition at a time is essential to intendings. (C 2 ) Acquisition at a time is the only difference between intentional and nonintentional propensities. In "Agency and Omniscience" I favored (C 1 ) and wrote as if it were sanctioned by (C 2 ), i.e., as though intentions must be acquired in order to distinguish them from innate or instinctual propensities to behave. Of course, (C 2 ) is an easy target since there are other differences among intentional and non-intentional propensities --content, for one thing (see below). Happily, as Hunt carefully observes (p. 356), the argument does not depend on (C 2 ).
Instead, Hunt questions (C 1 ), claiming that "the dominant account" of intentions cashes them out in terms of some belief-desire complex where "acquisition at a time does not appear to be an essential feature of beliefs or desires in general," nor of "the particular congeries of beliefs and desires which constitute intentions" (p. 357). Suppose I grab an umbrella from the umbrella stand as I go out the door. Were we to explain what makes this action intentional, we might cite beliefs, desires, know-how, goals, plans, rejections of alternatives, and assessments of competing values, but it would seem unnecessary to mention a further requirement of "acquisition" of an intention as either a sufficient or necessary condition (p. 357). Intentions usually are acquired, to be sure, but there is no reason for thinking this to be anything more than a contingent feature of human intentionality not automatically extendable to non-human agents.
Hunt bolsters the latter point by citing, with favor, Alston's "functionalist" account of the Divine Mind whereby an intention is whatever it is that functionally relates appropriate cognitive and conative factors (inputs) to manifestations of behavior (outputs). There is nothing in this description of an intentional propensity that requires acquisition in time, and so, Hunt concludes (p. 358), there is no good reason to accept any of (C 1 ), (2.4), or, (3) . As a result, there is no barrier to claiming that God's intentions may well have been possessed from all eternity.
Two criticisms of Hunt's strategy arise, one minor, the other significant. On the minor side, attempts to reduce intentions to complexes of beliefs and desires have come under attack within recent years, some arguing that intentional action can only be accounted for by appeal to a separate category of intentions (e.g., , Searle 1983 , Bratman 1987 , Mele 1988 . Their main point is that intending settles the mind upon a particular course of action so as to (i) be action-guiding and (ii) provide inputs into subsequent practical reasoning, features not guaranteed by the belief-desire complexes that have so far been identified. 2 Presumably, there is no "settling" of the mind unless it were previously unsettled, or, at least, not already committed to a particular course of action. One intends only by becoming resolved, even when no antecedent deliberation is present, but resolution is a temporal occurrence which results in a modification of behavioral proclivities. There would be no need to intend, no occasion for intending, were these proclivities already ensconced within one's motivational system. As such, (C 1 ) seems inescapable and it is not surprising to find the mentioned theories taking it for granted.
Perhaps a novel analysis of intentions in terms of a belief-desire complex might be more successful in accounting for these features of intention, though Hunt gives us no reasons to think so. His list of explanatory factors for intentional action-goals, plans, rejections of alternatives, etc.-employs well-known synonyms for 'intentions' and does little to advance the issue. One is not born with set goals, plans or rejections of alternatives already in place; these states are acquired over the course of time, consequent upon experience, success, frustration, and the envisionment of alternative actions, states, or modes of life. Any considerations supporting the acquisition of intentions apply mutatis mutandis to the acquisition of goals, plans, and rejections. 3 Let us suspend these misgivings for the moment, however, and assume with Hunt that (C 1 ) is false as a general principle, speaking as though each intending just is a certain belief-desire complex. The major difficulty with his argument against (3) is that there remains reason to think that some intentions-some belief-desire complexes-must be acquired. Recalling the ill-fated (C 2 ), note that intendings are "intentional" in having contents whereas the same is not true of the innate propensities to blink or withdraw one's hand from intensely hot surfaces. Intentions are like desires and beliefs in this respect. Yet, we have not secured (C 1 ); perhaps some desires are innate, say, the desire to live or to satisfy one's hunger, and, similarly, with some intentional propensities, specifically those whose content is purely general, e.g., to hit back when struck, or, for a intrinsically good being, to do what is right, to help the needy, to avoid violence, etc. If such general intentions are instinctual or innate then (C 1 ) must be abandoned as a principle governing all instances of intending.
But general intentions are insufficient for full-fledged agency. To act is to become related to various particulars, be these particular persons, objects, events, places or times, e.g., as when I played billiards with Henry at 4 pm yesterday afternoon. To act intentionally is to purposely relate oneself to particulars, and intentions-whether reducible to belief-desire complexes or not-are action-guiding only insofar as they serve to direct effort within the spatio-temporal realm of events and objects, that is, within the actual world of particulars. Intentions whose action components --that which is to be done --embody reference to definite particulars may be called specific intentions, distinguishing them from intentions whose action component is purely general, say, to help the needy. For example, if I intend to send a paper tomorrow to Religious Studies next week, then what I intend is laden with reference to particulars, e.g., to a particular agent, myself, to a particular journal, and to a particular interval. Only through this aspect of my intending can I be caused to initiate a chain of events which constitutes my intentionally sending a paper to Religious Studies. Even if an intention to help the needy, say, were innate, it would require a further specific intention to help that man over there and to do so now, and there could be no innate propensity to expend intentional effort in just this direction.
Why not? The reason is two fold. For one thing, to have a specific intention one must possess information about the particulars referred to, information that is itself specific, consisting not merely of knowledge about how members of certain sorts behave or how to behave when in such and such relation to them. It must embody reference to definite objects, events, places and durations within its content, reference that serves to orient oneself spatially and temporally to enable the flow of causal energy towards definite space-time regions. Secondly, such reference is possible only through interaction, presumably causal, with the particulars occupying related regions, in which case there is no way the required information can be obtained except through contact with particulars, though not necessarily those very ones referred to. Even an omniscient creator would have to possess information that it is creating this world rather than that, or just these particulars and not ones of some other sort. The reason that specific intentions must be acquired then, is that they are dependent upon acquired information. A reduction of intention to a desire-belief complex does not affect this general point, for if the contents of desires and beliefs are action-guiding as the reductionists claim then their content must also embody reference to definite particulars.
A restricted empiricism underlies this position. While there might be apriori knowledge (belief, thoughts) of a general sort, there is no thinking, belief, or knowledge about specific particulars without some aposteriori input. Such is the insight motivating causal theories of empirical knowledge. Were there an omniprescient being, its foreknowledge would be dependent upon contact with particulars, even if these were its own states, acts, beliefs, powers, choices, etc. Specific information must be acquired, and only thus do specific intentions fall into place.
These points are summarized in the following argument:
(a) To act intentionally, an agent must have a specific intention (that is, the agent must intend a content which embodies reference to particular persons, objects, events, times, or places). (b) To have a specific intention one must have specific information about particulars. (c) One has specific information about particulars only if one obtains that information through causal interaction with particulars. Therefore, (d) Specific information about particulars is not innate. Therefore, (e) No specific intention can be innate. Therefore, (f) In order to act, an agent must acquire an intention. Though not equivalent to premise (3) of Hunt's revised argument, (f) is all that is needed for the version set forth in Section IV below.
III. Intention, Ignorance, and the Presumption of Uncertainty
Hunt is content to retain premise (4) (pp. 359-63), targeting (5) instead. However, because (5) refers to a notion introduced in (4), the openness of a course of action, it is necessary to be clear on the interpretation of (4). Obviously an agent can be mistaken about what is or is not open, and consequently, what is required for intention is not so much that the action be open as that it be presumed by the agent to be open. Rather than (4), the principle which I proposed in "Agency and Omniscience" is this: (4*) If, at t, a minimally rational agent X both acquires an intention to do A at t' and believes that he has, then at some time appropriately prior to t, X presumes that his A-ing at t' is an open alternative for him.
(Presumption of Openness)
To take one's A-ing as open, in turn, is to assume the following:
(O 1 ) that there is a chance one would A were one to intend; (O 2 ) that one would not A unless one so intended; and (O 3 ) that one's intending A is as yet contingent relative to what one believes. 4 Strictly speaking, the condition of presumed openness provided by (4*) should be modified slightly to allow one's A-ing to be viewed as open even if one's A-ing could only be considered qua component of a larger action-plan and not something singled out as a separate doing. 5 To avoid needless complications, however, it suffices to utilize (4*) alone.
Fortunately, Hunt realizes that it is the presumption of openness that is at stake by the time he comes scrutinizing (5) , and this is brought out in his restatement (p. 363) of that premise as follows: (5!) X's A-ing at t' is a doxastically open alternative for A at t (that is, X presumes at t that, (i) there is a chance that he would A (would refrain from A-ing) at t' were he to intend to A (to refrain from A-ing) at t'; (ii) he would not A at t' unless he intended to A at t'; and (iii) his intending to A at t' is as yet contingent, i.e., (a) it is within his power at t to intend to A (to refrain from A-ing) at t', and (b) he does not possess at t a previously acquired intention to A (to refrain from A-ing) at t') only if X is ignorant at t whether or not he will A at t'.
On the assumption that this conditional is essential to my argument, Hunt contends that its antecedent might be satisfied while its consequent not, and in the course of his argument raises three critical points. Let us examine them closely, though for reasons of exposition, take up the second and third in reverse order.
Hunt's First Criticism (p. 364).
If we look at (5!) without clause (iiib), Hunt proposes, we can see that it rests on a "modal fallacy" common to fatalistic arguments for the pointlessness of action:
And on similar grounds, one might claim, it is pointless to intend what (one believes) will happen or what (one believes) will not happen. But the fallacy here is obvious. The fact that X will A at t' only means that X will not refrain from A-ing at t': it does not mean that X cannot refrain from A-ing at t'. Thus it has no implications for the effectiveness of X's intentions with respect to A-ing at t', and X (if rational) will not regard it as having such implications. (p. 364) As a criticism of anything I have said, however, this is off the mark. That X will A at t, or that X believes he will A at t', does not imply that X's intentions with respect to not A-ing at t' would not be efficacious. Nothing I said commits me to saying otherwise, nor does the implied fatalism follow from conditions (i), (ii), and (iiia) alone. Even if we add (iiib) and acknowledge a sense in which a future tensed truth can be necessary relative to what one now believes, we do not thereby emasculate one's intentions, nor undermine the truth of counterfactuals asserting their efficacy.
Hunt . Hunt disputes my (O 3 ) construal of the relative contingency in the openness presumption in terms of the set, (C) all that he or she (the agent) then (at t) believes (knows). He agrees that an omniscient agent could not take any of its actions as contingent relative to (C), in which case a required sense of openness so construed quickly rules out omniscient agency. Accordingly, he proposes a competitor as the proper index set for relative contingency:
(D) all propositions about times earlier than t that he or she (the agent) then (at t)
believes (knows). Hunt then writes:
Significantly, if doxastic openness were define in terms of (D) rather than (C), premise (5) would not go through; for then the agent's foreknowledge at that he will A at t', since it does not belong to (D), would not count against the relative contingency of his Aing at t'. (pp. 366-7) In other words, contingency relative to (D) does not imply contingency relative to all propositions true at t whereas contingency relative to (C) does. Hence, contingency relative to (D) does not have the same fatalistic consequence that contingency relative to (C) does, in which case it provides a superior account of doxastic openness.
This attempt to salvage omniscient agency fares no better than Hunt's first. For an omniscient being X at time t, set (D) will contain past-tensed propositions about its beliefs and knowledge of future-tensed propositions concerning what it will do or intend at any time t' later than t. Thus, (D) will include appropriate instances of the schemata,
(1) I (=X) knew that I will do A at t'.
(2) I (=X) knew that I will intend at t to do A at t'. Since X's beliefs are coextensive with its knowledge, then any such instances will be true. However, from the instance of (1) would follow the correlated instance of, (3) I (=X) will do A at t'. and from the instance of (2) follows that of, (4) I (=X) will intend at t to do A at t'. Consequently, since the latter are implied by members of set (D), they are necessary relative to set (D), and Hunt is simply wrong to think that (D) avoids the difficulty facing omniscient agency.
One might attempt to escape this consequence by denying truth-values to future contingents, but this is a route that Hunt does not pursue. Alternatively, one could insist that the members of (D) be purely about times prior to t, unlike (1) and (2) which contain embedded references to the future. While this move might succeed in blocking the foregoing derivations, it seriously distorts practical thinking. The latter is typically Janus-faced; agents do not face the future with a blank slate, but with a relatively rich set of expectations based on acquaintance with the past. It is in light of this set, a set that includes these future-tensed expectations, that they deliberate, plan, and commit themselves. The attempt to purify the index set on the presumed contingency, therefore, is committed an implausible picture of intentional agency.
Hunt . In his most forceful attack upon (5!), Hunt sets forth what he takes to be the reasoning underlying that principle. In his words (p. 365):
Any rational agent who (iv) believes that he will perform a certain action and (ii) presumes that he will perform that action only if he intends to perform it must also (v) believe that he intends to perform it. But if in addition he (iiib) presumes that he does not yet possess such an intention, he must (if rational) (vi) believe that he will acquire this intention sometime in the future. But it is impossible (the argument continues) to hold in advance a belief about what one will later decide to do. Since (vi) is necessarily false and is entailed by the conjunction of (i)-(iv), the latter is necessarily false. So if (i)-(iii) are true, (iv) must be false. And this is just what is claimed by (5!).
He then writes that this is the "strongest (if not the only) case that the critic of omniscient agency can make on behalf of (5!)" (p. 365). At its heart is a denial that the following schemata are consistent:
(via) X believes that he will intend to A at t'.
(vib) X believes that he does not yet intend to A at t'. But the critic who supports this denial must believe that the only grounds for a belief that one will intend to A is a present commitment to A-ing. That is, the critic must endorse the following conditional:
(H) At t X, believes that he will intend to A at t' only if X already intends at t to A at t' and believes that he so intends. 6 But this conditional is not true Hunt tells us. For one thing, it places "extraordinary restrictions" on God's foreknowledge, ruling out both "simple foreknowledge" and "middle knowledge." For another, it is falsified by the very possibility of someone's accepting a prediction that he will acquire an intention, say, to commit suicide five years hence (perhaps on the basis of having read this in a "book of life" (Goldman 1970 ) whose predictions have hitherto come true), even though he does not yet possess that intention. It seems wrong to deny that we can achieve enough understanding of our own character to predict some of our own intentions before actually acquiring those intentions. Hence, (H) is false and (5!) is deprived of support.
Certainly both (5!) and (H) are suspect, but nothing in the argument of "Agency and Omniscience" is committed to them. Nor does it rule out the possibility of simple foreknowledge and middle knowledge; it implies nothing about the mechanisms whereby an omniscient being has knowledge of future acts or about the nature of "free" acts. Rather, its claim is that in taking a course of action to be open an agent is disposed towards an avowal of ignorance, as would be reflected in the answer of a deliberator who, when interrupted and asked if he now knows what course of action he will pick, replies, "No, not at this stage: I've not yet made up my mind." It is this feeling of one's mind being yet unsettled that underlies the following principle which was set forth in "Agency and Omniscience":
(5*) If, at t, a rational being X presumes that his intending to A t t' is contingent relative to what he himself then believes, then at t, X presumes both that he does not yet believe that he will intend to A at t' and that he does not yet believe that he will not intend to A at t'. (Presumption of Uncertainty)
For ordinary agents, this presumption might be mistaken, and consequently we allow for the joint satisfiability of (via) and (vib) and insist upon the falsity of (H). In Kapitan 1989, a case against principles like (5!) was developed by citing the not infrequent occurrence of forming an intention to A at t, acquiring a corresponding belief that one will A at t, and yet temporarily overlooking or forgetting both in the course of deliberating about an alternative. To overlook an intention or a belief is not to abandon either, though it does suggest that both are submerged beneath a layer of immediately accessed information, including the belief that taking the considered alternative is contingent relative to what one believes. Therefore, one might well have --in some sense of "have" --a belief that one will intend to A at t while simultaneously possessing a sense of openness about A-ing at t.
The correct way to view (5*) is not as a claim precluding foreknowledge of what one will do intentionally, nor as one ruling out the presumption of an act as open while knowing in advance that one will refrain from it. Rather, the presumption is an crucial aspect of the "resolution" picture of intention suggested in section II, wherein intentions are acquired against a background milieu of information, information that includes a more or less unarticulated sense that the future is "open" with respect to a certain intentional effort and, by that very fact, that one is not yet committed or "settled" upon it. A presumption of openness is at once a presumption of indecision and, ipso facto a presumption of uncertainty. Both, in turn, are implied by the agent's sense that the course of action is contingent relative to what he takes himself to believe, or, in the more direct first-person mode, relative to what I take to be the case or, better, "as far as I can tell." 7 Rather than (5!), the incompatibility claim is that an agent cannot, qua rational, simultaneously access the beliefs that (i) he will do a certain action A at a future time t and (ii) that his A-ing at t is yet an open alternative. A sense of openness cannot coexist on a par with an equally vivid sense of intentional closure, but this is just to acknowledge epistemic limitations. This said, we have an argument for a second premise of the revised argument against omniscient agency. Let X be any ideally rational agent and t 1 and t 2 any times such that t 1 ≤ t 2 :
(g) If at t 1 X acquires an intention to A at t 2 then there is a time t 3 , t 3 ≤ t 1 , during which X presumes that his A-ing at t 2 is an open alternative. (h) If at time t 3 X presumes that his A-ing at t 2 is an open alternative then at t 3 X regards his intending at t 1 to A at t 2 as contingent relative to what he then believes. (i) If at a time t 3 X regards his intending at t 1 to A at t 2 as contingent relative to what he then believes, then X at t 3 presumes both that he does not yet believe that he will intend at t 1 to A at t 2 and that he does not yet believe that he will not intend at t 1 to A at t 2 , and (j) If at a time t 3 X presumes both that he does not yet believe that he will intend at t 1 to A at t 2 and that he does not yet believe that he will not intend at t 1 to A at t 2 , then at t 3 either X is ignorant of what he will intend or ignorant about that he then believes. Therefore, (k) If at t 1 X acquires an intention at to A at t 2 then there is a time t 3 , t 3 ≤ t 1 , during which X is ignorant of some proposition.
In other words, (k) is the claim that an agent cannot acquire a specific intention unless there is a time during which that agent is ignorant of some proposition.
IV. The Revised Argument Against Omniscient Agency
Recall that the argument of Section II established the following claim: (f) To act intentionally presupposes acquiring a specific intention. In Section III we have just shown, (k) An agent acquires a specific intention only if there is a time during which that agent is ignorant of some proposition. From these two premises it is but a short step to the major result:
Theorem. There is no omniscient agent.
